THE THEATER
Boko Haram emerged in Maiduguri in 2002, splintered in 2016, and the breakaway Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) now controls swathes of the Lake Chad basin where Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad meet. The insurgency is regional, not Nigerian — which is why border-state cooperation matters more than bilateral US-Nigeria deals.
WHY THE REAPER
The MQ-9 Reaper loiters for 27+ hours at altitudes commercial radar struggles to track, carries Hellfire missiles and 500-lb bombs, and costs roughly $30M per airframe. Its value in the Sahel is persistence — it watches a target compound across days, not minutes — but persistence requires a basing footprint, which is why the 2024 US eviction from Niger's Air Base 201 reshaped the entire regional posture.
THE COUP BELT
Since 2020, military juntas have taken power in Mali (2020, 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022, twice), Niger (2023), and Gabon (2023). All but Gabon expelled French forces; Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger formed the Alliance of Sahel States and pivoted toward Russia's Africa Corps (formerly Wagner). Nigeria is now the southern anchor of remaining Western influence in the region.
WHY METRICS GO MISSING
Security cooperation agreements without benchmarks are a feature, not a bug. Both governments avoid them: the host state doesn't want a public failure metric tied to attack counts, and the donor doesn't want to be locked into a tripwire that forces escalation or withdrawal. The result is open-ended commitment that survives bad years.
THE FUNDING ENGINE
ISWAP and Boko Haram run on cattle rustling, road taxation, kidnapping ransoms, and zakat extracted under threat. SBM Intelligence estimated Nigerian kidnap ransoms exceeded $18M in early 2023 alone. Drones can hit commanders; they cannot drain a tax base that runs through every village market in the northeast.