THE BOTTLENECK
Hormuz is 33 km wide at its narrowest, with shipping lanes only 3 km each — two inbound, two outbound, separated by a 3 km buffer. Roughly 21 million barrels of oil pass through daily, about 21% of global consumption.
WHY ESCORTS ARE HARD
Convoy operations require a warship per few tankers, continuous air cover, and minesweepers ahead. The 1987–88 Operation Earnest Will reflagged Kuwaiti tankers under US flag — the largest naval escort since WWII — and still lost the USS Samuel B. Roberts to a single Iranian mine.
THE INSURANCE CHOKEPOINT
Lloyd's of London war-risk premiums — not the mines or missiles themselves — are what close a shipping lane. Once Joint War Committee adds a region to its listed areas, premiums spike from fractions of a percent to multiples; commercial vessels reroute regardless of military presence.
THE BYPASS LIMITS
Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (5 mn bbl/day) and the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah line (1.5 mn bbl/day) reroute exports to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Together they handle maybe a third of Gulf flows. The rest — Iranian, Iraqi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari LNG — has no alternative.
THE TANKER WAR PRECEDENT
From 1984 to 1988, Iran and Iraq attacked over 400 commercial ships in the Gulf. Oil prices spiked briefly but markets adapted — tankers were reflagged, escorted, and insured at higher premiums. The lesson planners took: disruption is easier to threaten than to sustain. A two-month full closure has no modern precedent.
WHO LOSES MOST
Asia takes ~80% of Hormuz oil. China, India, Japan, and South Korea import the bulk; Europe and the US are marginal customers since the shale revolution. A closure is a tax on Asian growth, not Western consumption.
THE ODDS MARKET
Prediction markets price the geopolitical tail. A Hormuz announcement contract aggregates every trader's read on whether Trump escalates, negotiates, or accepts the closure as a fait accompli.