THE PIVOT EAST
Before 2022, Europe was Russia's largest trading partner and bought roughly half its oil exports. Sanctions and the Druzhba pipeline freeze redirected those flows; China is now Russia's single largest customer, taking the volumes Europe refused.
WHY THE SURPLUS STAYS FLAT
Russia sells commodities (oil, gas, coal, timber) priced in falling global benchmarks. China sells finished goods (cars, electronics, machinery) at stable margins. Even as volume grows, Russia's terms of trade erode — more barrels for the same yuan.
THE YUAN SETTLEMENT SHIFT
By 2024, more than 90% of Russia-China trade settled in rubles and yuan, up from under 20% before 2022. This was forced, not chosen — secondary US sanctions on Chinese banks handling dollar-denominated Russian transactions made the dollar route unworkable.
THE STUCK YUAN PROBLEM
Russian exporters earn yuan in Shanghai but cannot freely convert them. China maintains capital controls that cap how much yuan can leave; Russia ends up holding yuan balances it cannot easily spend on non-Chinese imports. The currency is convertible in name, captive in practice.
THE ASYMMETRY
China is Russia's largest partner; Russia is not China's. Russian trade is roughly 4% of China's total — meaningful but replaceable. Beijing sets the price, the currency, and the pace; Moscow accepts the terms because the alternative is no buyer at all.
THE 'NO LIMITS' CEILING
Xi and Putin declared a 'no limits' partnership weeks before the 2022 invasion. The limits showed up quickly: China has not recognized Russian annexations, has not supplied lethal weapons, and Chinese banks routinely freeze transactions that risk US secondary sanctions. The partnership is deep where it is cheap for Beijing, shallow where it is costly.