THE CHOKEPOINT
Hormuz is 33 km wide at its narrowest, but the shipping lanes are just 3 km each — two inbound, two outbound, separated by a 3 km buffer. Roughly 21 million barrels of oil pass through daily, about 21% of global consumption. The deepest channel hugs the Iranian side.
THE TANKER WAR PRECEDENT
From 1984 to 1988, Iran and Iraq attacked over 400 commercial ships in the Gulf. The US response — Operation Earnest Will — reflagged Kuwaiti tankers under the Stars and Stripes and escorted them through with warships. It was the largest naval convoy operation since WWII, and it worked: oil kept flowing.
THE INSURANCE CHOKEPOINT
Lloyd's of London war-risk premiums — not the mines or missiles themselves — are what close a shipping lane. Once underwriters classify a strait as a *listed area*, premiums can jump 10× in days. Commercial vessels reroute regardless of whether the physical threat materializes. The financial chokepoint is tighter than the military one.
WHY COALITIONS, NOT NAVIES
Single-flag escorts politicize every transit — a US warship escorting a Greek tanker becomes a US-Iran incident. Multinational frameworks (CTF-153, the European-led EMASoH/Agénor since 2020) distribute the diplomatic risk and let Gulf states accept protection without endorsing any single power's posture.
WHY IRAN CAN'T BE BYPASSED
Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline (5 mn bbl/day capacity) and the UAE's Habshan-Fujairah line together could reroute roughly a third of Gulf exports around Hormuz. Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Iran itself have no overland alternative — every barrel and LNG cargo must transit the strait.
THE LEGAL REGIME
Under UNCLOS Article 38, ships hold a right of *transit passage* through international straits — coastal states cannot suspend it. Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but never ratified, and maintains that only states party to the convention enjoy the right. The US, also non-ratifier, claims the right as customary international law.