TehranRussia’s Vienna envoy Ulyanov confirmed Moscow shares China’s Hormuz veto position.
Both powers vetoed an earlier Security Council draft last month; the new US-Bahraini resolution faces a likely double veto.
Iran closed the strait after February 28 US-Israeli strikes; Tehran said Trump’s blockade violated the ceasefire Pakistan brokered April 8.
Sources: Mehr News Agency
THE VETO MECHANIC
Any one of the five permanent Security Council members — US, UK, France, Russia, China — can kill any non-procedural resolution with a single negative vote. Abstentions don't count as vetoes; only an explicit 'no' from a P5 member blocks adoption, regardless of how the other 14 council members vote.
THE DOUBLE-VETO PATTERN
Russia and China have voted together on roughly 80% of contested Security Council resolutions since 2011, when they jointly vetoed the first Syria resolution. The alignment is not formal alliance — it is shared interest in blocking Western-led intervention precedents that could one day be turned on Beijing or Moscow.
WHY HORMUZ IS DIFFERENT
The strait sits between Iran and Oman, not Iran and any Arab state. Iran's coastline runs along the entire northern edge, and the deepest shipping lane hugs the Iranian side. Closing it is geographically trivial for Tehran; reopening it requires either Iranian consent or sustained naval combat in waters Iran has spent forty years mining and fortifying.
THE TRANSIT-PASSAGE QUESTION
Under UNCLOS Article 38, ships have a right of transit passage through international straits — coastal states cannot suspend it. Iran signed UNCLOS in 1982 but never ratified, and has long argued Hormuz falls under its domestic law, not the convention. The legal ambiguity is the diplomatic opening Russia and China exploit at the Security Council.
WHAT MOSCOW AND BEIJING GET
Russia ships ~3 mn barrels/day from its own Baltic and Pacific ports — a Hormuz closure tightens global oil and lifts Urals crude prices, partially offsetting sanctions. China imports roughly half its crude from the Gulf and would seem to lose; but Beijing's calculation is strategic, not commercial — blocking a US-led resolution preserves the precedent that Washington cannot use the Council to legitimize Gulf military operations.
THE TANKER WAR LESSON
From 1984 to 1988, Iran and Iraq attacked over 400 commercial ships in the Gulf. Oil prices spiked briefly, then markets adapted — tankers were reflagged under US and Kuwaiti flags and escorted by warships. Disruption proved easier to threaten than to sustain, but the reflagging operation took 14 months to organize and cost the US Navy 37 sailors when the USS Stark was hit.