THE COLONIAL BORDER
French Sudan became Mali in 1960 with borders drawn in Paris, stapling the Tuareg north — pastoralist, Berber, oriented toward the Sahara trade — onto a Bambara-majority south oriented toward the Atlantic. Every Tuareg rebellion since 1963 (1990, 2006, 2012) has been the same border refusing to settle.
THE 2012 RUPTURE
When Gaddafi fell in 2011, Tuareg fighters in his army returned to northern Mali with Libyan weapons and declared the state of Azawad. Within weeks, al-Qaeda-linked groups hijacked the rebellion, imposed harsh rule on Timbuktu and Gao, and pushed south. France's Operation Serval (2013) drove them back; they never left, they dispersed.
WHAT JNIM IS
Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin formed in 2017 by merging four Sahel jihadist groups under Iyad Ag Ghaly, a former Tuareg rebel leader. It is the formal al-Qaeda franchise for the Sahel, distinct from Islamic State Sahel Province — the two are rivals and fight each other as often as they fight the state.
THE FUEL CHOKE
Landlocked Mali imports nearly all refined fuel through the Dakar–Bamako corridor (1,250 km of road and a derelict rail line). JNIM does not need to take Bamako — it just needs to burn tankers. A fuel-strangled capital cannot move troops, run generators, or pump water.
THE WAGNER PIVOT
After expelling France in 2022, the junta brought in Russia's Wagner Group (rebranded Africa Corps after Prigozhin's 2023 death). Wagner specializes in regime protection, not counterinsurgency — its presence keeps the colonels in power but does nothing to clear roads. The July 2024 Tinzaouaten ambush killed dozens of Wagner fighters in a single Tuareg-JNIM joint operation.
THE QUIZ
The Sahel jihadist landscape is often flattened into 'al-Qaeda affiliates' but the internal fault lines drive the war.